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environmentalism.
After all, a concrete
parking lot is relatively stable.
Of Leo
Leopold II SS three criteria for noral rightness in
the envirorunent (beauty, stability, and in
integrity), only natural integrity seems to
make sense.
If we consider a forest that is
ravaged by a fire caused by a bolt of light
lightning, we see a simplified system that results
from a loss of stability.
Moreover, it sus
sustains a major loss of sentient life.
Yet,
.all
,all this is a result of natural processes,
and so I see no real loss of value here.
I
think that this kind of case reflects the
compromise criteria that Finsen is trying to
develop.
The key to understanding natural
envirorunental value is not in stable environ
environments that tend to produce K-selectors; the
key to understanding environmental value lies
in the idea of natural change.

ANIMAL RIGHTS
AND ECOHOLISM
ARE NOt COMPATIBLE

Finally, let me say that both views,
animal rights individualism and ecoholism,
continue to have problems with seriously
endangered species. Proponents of the fonner
cannot say why individual rare animals are
nore important than plentiful ones, especial
especially when they are ugly.
Holists cannot say
why non-functioning species (as nost rare
ones are) are important at all.
I have,
therefore, developed a theory (or an excuse)
based on the idea of reparations.
Human
society owes canpensation
compensation to those survivors
of any extinction process begun by humans.
If this~. view is correct, then there would be
no reason to "prevent
'prevent naturally occurring
extinctions, i.e., extinctions that do not
result from human interference in the envienvi
ronment.
If the koala bear species eats all
the leaves off the eucalyptus trees, thereby
dooming both the tree species and itself,
then it is simply too bad for the koala bear.
They will be extinct, and humanity does not
have to feel the least bit guilty.

SIDNEY GamIN
GE:IDIN

Eastern
Pastern Michigan University

In her admirable paper, Professor Finsen
succeeds in clarifying the views of some of
the leading ecoholists, and she also succeeds
in showing that their views are not terr~ly
far from those of the animal rights people.
Nevertheless, there are important differences
between the philosophy of ecoholism and that
of animal rights that cannot be minimized.'
suppos
Professor Finsen is too ambitious in supposrecon
ing that she can supply a theoretical reconciliation of the two positions.

of Professor
I take it that the essence of,
eco
Fihsen I s paper is that those she calls ecoRodman and Leopold-Leopold-
holists--for example, Rodmatl
love not any old biotic environment but those
that show "integrity, stability and beauty."
These are precisely the environments that are
ani
particularly kind to the organisms that animal rights proponents favor.
As she put it,
the ecoholist "values the very systems which
tl:J.e sentient beings valued by
give rise to the

In conclusion, let me repeat my claim
that we are presented here with two different
methodologies of applied ethics.
The nost
important issue thus facing us is which apap
proach we will take as we try to solve ethicethic
al problems regarding animals and the envienvi
ronment. I vote for examining the resolution
of problems in the concrete situation and for
postponing metaphysical speculations, however
interesting they may be, because they rarely
lead to pragmatic solutions.
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sion analogously to Dworkin's use of the word
when he explains what it means to take rights
seriously.
And what it means is that in the
nomal
normal course of events, "rights trump utiliutili
ties." In short, I mean that strong ecoholecohol
ism is itself a rights based view.
It takes
species and environments seriously. I emphaempha
size "and environments" because there are at
least two other sorts of things ecoholists
seem to hold dear besides species that puts
them at odds with animal rights proponents.

individualists." And she makes this case out
entirely persuasively. The problem, hOl¥'ever,
is that there are ecoholists
eooholists and ecoholists.
Whatever the
stature of Rodman, Leopold,
Partridge, and sagoff, they do not have a
rronopoly on ecoholism and, in my opinion, do
not appear, at least on the basis of Finsen' s
account, to present the boldest version of
that pulosophy.

Consider, for example, what Finsen tells
us about Leopold.
Leopold made the claim
that a thing is good if it contributes to the
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biobio
tic ccmnunity,
but Susan Finsen rightly
points out that he did not say and in any
case should not have said that a thing is
good only if it makes such a contribution.
In this way we can value things for reasons
other than their role in the envirorunent.
Obviously she is right, and i f Leopold underunder
stood this, then that is to his credit.
On
the other hand, there are rrore unbending
ecoholists, such as Robert Loftin, who expliexpli
citly claims that "it is wasteful to focus
concern on animals rather than on ecosysecosys
tems. "[ 1) In Loftin's view, no value at all

Even i f animal rights people made some
grudging concessions concerning the value of
species, it would nevertheless only be animal
species that they could take seriously.
But
ecoholists appear to value plant species to
about the same extent as they value animal
species.
I take it that the r-selection arrl
k-selection principles that Finsen appeal to
apply to plant species too, and that one can
as well point to stable, beautiful plant
enviromnents with integrity as one can to
animal environments. But must these k-seleck-selec
ted environments contain the sentient beings
so valued by animal rights individualists?

They need not. And certainly one can imagine
a flourishing k-selected environment becaning
threatened by an intruding human.
Suppose
Robinson Crusoe came along to a certain very
small island knOlNing that he would be rescued
in three or four rronths but only if he used
up the otherwise self-sustaining k-selecting
plants.
This is the sort of conflict that
Regan may have envisioned, and nothing in
Finsen 's analysis shOlNS us hOI¥' the ecoholist
can be on the side of poor Mr. Crusoe.

attaches, for example, to trying to give
medical assistance to wild animals.
And
Loftin goes so far as to claim that it is
only holistic entities such as species and
entire ecosystems that are the locus of valval
ue.
Consequently, the "only if" provision
that Finsen says is lacking in Leopold is
present in Loftin. Nothing in Finsen's paper
will reconcile a view such as Loftin's with a
view such as Regan's.

In his review of Tom Regan's The case
for Animal Rights, [2) J. Baird callicott
oonfesses that Regan's liking for furry creacrea
tures "irritates" him. callioott makes quite
clear that he is not only as concerned about
plants as he is with animals but also as
ooncerned with species of plants as for spespe
cies of animals.
His view, though, is the
very paradigm of the arcanum.
He certainly
doesn't grant rights to plants, since he
doesn't grant them to animals; rrore exactly,
he denies that it is sensible to attribute
rights to wild animals, since that would be
in effect to domesticate them (presumably a
bad thing).
Although he seems to think dodo
mesticated animals have some rights and wild
animals do not, one must not be misled into
thinking that he thinks that domesticated
animals are rrore entitled to our concern.

Professor Finsen makes sensible observaobserva
tions about hOI¥' little disagreement there
need be between echolists and animal rightright
ists over hunting and trapping, the treatment
of domestic animals and the alleged paradoxes
of predation, but she falters, I believe,
with respect to the issue of endangered spespe
cies, which is one of the i.creconcilable
issues separating the two camps.
strong ecoholism (perhaps not preached
Leopold despite his near guru status in
the rrovement), takes envirorunents and species
seriously and is not merely proposing that a
rrore sensitive approach than is usual to the
enviromnent is for the greater good.
By my
saying ecoholists take envirorunents "serious"serious
ly," I mean, of course, to use this expresexpres

by
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snaildarter to the well-being of the biotic
ccxmnunity is minimal.
community
They must know that
the world can survive the loss of the snailsnail
darter even IOClre
rrore easily than it has survived
passen
without the saber tooth tiger and the passenreminis
ger pigeon.
Despite a lot of hocum reminisrrovies where someone
cent of old Bela Lugosi IOClvies
sooner or later would say, "There are things
in nature man should not tamper with!," the
fact is that this tampering with the snail
snaildarter and other insignificants cannot be
what bothers the ecoholist.
It is, rather,
commitment to endangered
that he has a deep cormnitment
species for their own sake.
He or she takes
their rights seriously.

And the fact that he probably does not think
that plants have rights should not lead us to
suppose that he thereby thinks they are less
entitled to our concern.
In any case,
for
reasons that are too hard for me to grasp,
mysteri
Callicott appears to think that some mysterious
0us
ecological considerations trump both
rights and ordinary utilitarian
factors.
Callicott appears, for whatever reason, to be
rrore concerned about the good of, say, a
IOClre
dachs
weasel than he is about the good of a dachshund. In any case, however he may feel about
this, Callicott does tell us that the key to
reconciling environmental ethics with animal
rights is to understand that wild animals
have no rights.
This certainly has the air
para
of paradox, but it needn't really be a paradox.
Think of it, instead, as a quaint way
of telling the animal rights proponents that
they are wrong. The reconciliation is a pure
one way street. It is effected by asking the
animal rights people to give-up
give' up their view.
(I must confess that I shall later make the
rrove of asking ecoholists to give up
same IOClve

Professor Finsen proposes to reconcile
the survival issue--i.e., Regan's concern
rrore important than
over whether his life is IOClre
that of a wildflower--by appeal to what she
calls "act holism" and "rule holism," but
implica
apart from the fact that she has the implications of these two views reversed, she cannot
Fin
bring about the desired reconciliation. Finsen says that i f there was some important
dilemma in which one had to choose between
killing a human and killing a wildflower,
hol
then rule holism (also called "indirect holII'Ore
ism" by her) gives us a way out.
It is IOClre
defensible than act-holism because it warns
us not to deal with nature on a case-by-case
basis. She thinks that the rule holist would
advise us to sacrifice the wildflower because
inte
rule holism recognizes and respects the interests of sentient beings.
However, Finsen
seems to overlook the fact that an act holist
can
recognize the interests of sentient
f a rule holist can.
beings iif
After all,
their differences are methodological only and
are not about fundamental values.
But she
characterizes the act holist as insisting
and, every instance, we must
that in each and.every
preserve the integrity and stability of the
biotic cormnunity In fact, it is only because
she recognizes the inherent preposterousness
of killing a human being for the sake of a
wildflower that Professor Finsen is so eager
to find a way out.
That way is to postulate
rule holism and to suppose that it would
contain a rule that said something like this:
whenever there is a straightforward . conflict
or interests such that we must choose between
v
the survival of a human being and the survival of a wildflower, then we choose that the
human being should survive.
What sort of
ecoholism is this?

their view.)
Let me be very brief with respect to the
unbridge
other matter that I said creates an unbridgeable impasse between the ecoholists and the
animal rights proponents.
The other matter
is the fascination the ecoholists have with
forma
non-living nature:
a beautiful rock fonnation, the "unspoiled" wilderness, the Grand
Canyon, etc. R. Will Flowers says that deep
ex
ecologists would feel repugnance at the exrrol1se to
termination of a species of beach IOClllse
make room for condominiums.
He likens this
insur
to murdering an old man for his life insurance. [3]
I do not doubt in the slightest
that Flowers (wonderf ul name! ) would not
countenance the destruction of the beach for
the sake of those despised condominiums even
rrouse. EcoholEcohol
if we could relocate the poor mouse.
non
ists who preach this sort of love for nonliving nature are preaching, I believe, an
aesthetics of nature and not an ethics. Like
ecoholists, many animal respectors have a
passionate love for nature's
nature I s beauties, but
when push comes to shove, they believe ethics
olTer aesthetics.
takes priority over
I said I did not think that ecoholists
are disguised consequenti,alists. In my view,
their obsession with aesthetics
confirms
that.
Those who worry seriously about the
fate of the snaildarter understand perfectly
well.
I trust that the contribution of the
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making the p::>sition of the ecoholist more
palatable.
I say the survival issue is a
red herring because when I looked casually
through some of the writings of Leop::>ld I did
not notice any discussion of what to do when
a human life hung in the balance against that
of a wildflower.
In truth, Leop::>ld and his
early supporters were not in the tradition of
Anglo-American philosophy,
thrust and councoun
ter-thrust, thesis and counter-example. This
is even more obvious in the works of LeoLeo
pold's predecessors, people like Audubon and
John Muir, the founder of the Sierra Club.
Even today's environmental organizations rely
heavily for their membership up::>n "animal
lovers."
The rank and file membership of
groups like the Sierra Club, the National
Wilderness Society,
the Audubon Society,

Any credible variety of ecoholism ITRlst
contain rules that are weighted in favor of
ecosystems and species.
If there is such a
thing as a rule holist, he or she does not
prop::>se rules for resolving conflicts between
ecosystems and people; rather, she/he holds
that once we discover the very best rules for
maintaining the ecosystem, we should hold
fast to them even when it 'seems that in a
given cirClUllStance we would do better for the
---ecx:>system by violating the rule.
He would
not, qua ecoholist, preach that when the
well-being of an ecosystem or species concon
flicted with the well-being of a human being,
we should put the well-being of the latter
ahead of the former.
As for an act holist,
he/she would tell us only that if we truly
desire to protect the ecosystem, then it
isn't good enough always to abide by rules.
Whatever the internecine battles of two varivari
eties of ecoholism, none of this will help
poor Tom Regan when his life is being threatthreat
ened.
When we talk of p::>ssible conflicts bebe
tween a biotic canmunity and humans, do we
not usually misdescribe the nature of the
conflicts?
Sane years ago there was the
celebrated snaildarter case in which the
proposed dam would have put an end to snailsnail
darters once and for all.
Note that was a
real conflict.
It is only philosophers who
raise the issue of a snaildarter's life hanghang
ing in the balance with a human life.
Envi
Environmentalists worry about strip mining and
its effects on the integrity, stability, and
beauty of the biotic corrmunity.
They are
countered with arguments concerning economic
necessity or something of that sort.
No one
ever argues, "Either we strip mine tOllDrrow,
or we die tOllDrrow. It Environmentalists are
usually doing battle with Secretaries of the
Interior and Commerce or representatives of
the oil, mining, timber, and other indus'indus'
tries.
The conflict is not choosing between
destruction of a valuable biotic system and
the death of human beings.
The notorious
Secretary of the Interior, James Watts, did
not hold the curious view that the lives of
humans are being threatened by the principles
of enviroronentalists.
Nor do I think that
most ecpholists want to put the well-being of
the biotic community above that of the lives
of the human community.
That non-issue is
but a red. ,herring designed to make ecoholism
look foolish.
Consider how Finsen' s attempt
to reconcile survival dilermna depends on
BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES
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even, I think, Ducks Unlimited fancies itself
in favor
favor of animal rights.
And perhaps the
of these organizations think of them
themleaders of
selves that way, too.
What has happened is
this. There is or was so much bombast on the
part of those who proclaimed a "land ethic"
al:rrost inevitable that there
that it was alrrost
would be unrealized implications of precisely
the sort that trained analytic philosophers
with pro-animal sentiments were bound to take
exception to.
More sophisticated philoso
philosophers with pro-land ethic sentiments, like
Rodman, leaped into the fray and, so far as I
can tell, have extended their commitment to
ecoholism beyond the wildest dreams of their
original mentors. In any case, so I see it.

DOMBROWSKI ON
INDIVIDUALS, SPECIES,

It is Finsen I s merit that she has done
her very best to salvage the views of people
like Rodman by showing that they want much
the same sorts of things that animal rights
proponents do.
Unhappily, the deck was
stacked against her because--and I hope the
won 't find it outrageous that I put
reader won't
this so baldly--it is trivially true that
sentient life has value independent of its
role in any ecosystem, and it is also true,
although perhaps not trivially, that an ecoeco
system has no value that could ever supersede
the value of the totality of sentient life.
(This is not to say that deep ecology is
false.
Ecosystems may have their own, but
lesser, value independent of the value of
sentient beings.) Ecoholism, when not driven
to extravagant limits, has much in it to be
admired.
When it conflicts with a concern
for life, it is patently absurd.
The best
reconciliation would be for the ecoholists to
admit this.

AND ECOSYSTEMS

DAVID N. JAMES
IDngwood College

At the end of his excellent historical
study,
The Philosophy of
Vegetarianism,
Daniel Dombrowski suggests that "perhaps the
most sophisticated version" of "a world of
nature alive" "is found in the recent thought
of Charles Hartshorne. [l]"
[1)" The present paper
develops such an Harshornian metaphysics and
applies it to the moral status of individuals
and species.
in
According to Dombrowski, animals, including humans, are individuals made up of
living cells.
Lacking the integration of a
nervous system, plants are individuals in a
A mere colony of cells,
much weaker sense.
"each for the most part on their own," plants
also lack the psychological individuality of
animals, Sentiency 2, the ability to feel
experien
pain.
But lower-level feelings or experien-
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